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THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
THE Los ANGELES RIOTS
HENRY J. RICHARDSON, III*
I. INTRODUCTION
By now much has been written, preached, propagandized, analyzed
and moralized about the Los Angeles riots. We need not rehearse here
either the facts of the trial and acquittal of the police officers who beat
Rodney King, the subsequent fire and destruction or the resulting fed-
eral and state trials of the officers and riot participants. This Article will
discuss the international reactions to the acquittals and the riot while
exploring several crucial issues with implications for United States pol-
icy, international law and Afro-America in the world community. The
Article will also explore comparative claims regarding causation for the
riots and the responses of the Vatican and the southern tier of the world
community to these claims. Some initial consideration will be given to
recent United States. policy trends in order to place the international
community's response to Los Angeles in context. Finally, the author
will offer some reflections on the patterns of reactions from overseas,
the policy and international legal issues they raise, and the divergent
expectations about, for example, American racism they may represent.
II. BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles riots necessarily raise value considerations in the
American and international communities concerning power, wealth,
human rights, loyalty patterns, intellectual skills, patterns of knowledge,
well being and control in these communities of decisions about as-
signing labels of "right" and "wrong."' Through these value considera-
tions we can project in a provisional way the implications of future
international reactions. This is particularly important regarding diver-
gent expectations about race and the multi-cultural group and class
dominance realities of the United States. International reactions to the
Los Angeles riots arose not in a vacuum, but in the presence of perti-
nent principles - law goals and objectives already part of the constitutive
structure of the world community and its tightly knit fabric of global
interdependence. 2 The rising authority of international human rights
* Professor of Law, Temple University. I am greatly indebted to Kwame Anthony
Gyan, L.L.M., Temple University, 1992, and Marcelle Benjamin, J.D., Temple University,
1993, for superb research assistance. All errors of course remain my own.
1. These value considerations are integral to the "New Haven school" jurisprudence
of Myres McDougal, Harold Lasswell and Associates. See, e.g., MYRES S. McDOUGAL ET AL.,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 3-93 (1980).
2. Articles 1 & 2 of Chapter I, Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter
set forth the pertinent principles and goals.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
law has been driven by a global pattern of demands for representative
government plus a recent consistent focus on the protection of personal
rights against abuse, such as torture. s To this must be added a continu-
ing focus on second-generation human rights found in Somalia and
other disaster situations, e.g., the right to food.
4
Since the demise of the Soviet Union and the rise of the other two
legs of the "triad" (the European Economic Community and Japan) the
"rules-of-the-game" evaluation of the current status of the United States
as the sole great power has energetically begun. Whatever conclusions
The purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles ofjustice and international law, adjustment or settlement of inter-
national disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
(4) To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment
of these common ends.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
Article 2. The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in
Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
(1) The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of
all its Members.
(2) All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights, and benefits
resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed
by them in accordance with the present Charter.
(3) All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in
such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.
(4) All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations.
(5) All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action
it takes in accordance with the present Charters and shall refrain from giving
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive
of enforcement action.
(6) The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the
United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be nec-
essary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially the domestic jurisdiction of
any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the applica-
tion or enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
3. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); see also U.N. DRAFr
CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND THEIR CRUEL INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR
PUNISHMENT, G.A. Res. 39/46 Annex, 39 U.N. GSOR, Supp. (No. 51) 197, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/1984/72, Annex (1984), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984).
4. See Philip Alston, The International Monetary Fund and the Right to Food, 30 How. L.J.
473 (1987); HenryJ. Richardson, The International Human Rights Response, 30 How. L.J. 233
(1987). See generally Symposium, 1986 World Food Day Food and Law Conference: The Legal
Faces of the Hunger Problem, 30 How. L.J. 193 (1987).
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are drawn from this question throughout the international community
will have both public order and constitutive implications with global ef-
fects. 5 This is particularly the case since the United Nations' enforce-
ment action in the Gulf in early 1991 was accompanied by the
proclamation-perhaps premature in the form stated, and clearly an un-
formed concept at the moment-by George Bush of a "new world or-
der."'6 What the President failed to include in the scope of the
proclamation were questions of equitable and non-discriminatory treat-
ment of Afro-Americans and our empowerment in America-long an in-
ternational issue. 7 Also not included was the question of the political
will to break the destructive cycle of America's inner cities and the rela-
tion of that cycle to Afro-America's youth and the future of both Afro-
America and the country as a whole. Yet these questions are integral
elements of any understanding of world order, new or old. American
policy objectives concerning these questions, whether negative or posi-
tive, containment-driven or remedy-driven, coercion-driven or equity-
driven, have their ready analogies regarding dozens offavelas, bidonvilles,
barrios, districts and ghettos around the world. These questions likewise
connect directly to those of welcome, empowerment and equity for re-
cent immigrants to a national community. For instance, the maltreat-
ment of immigrants is increasingly considered to be a new malicious
form of racism on an international basis.
8
One cannot be aware of the demographics of the Los Angeles area
without realizing that it comprises interlocking frontiers among several
crucial political, economic, racial and cultural goals and categories of
human policymaking. Los Angeles features frontiers between the First
and Third Worlds, development and underdevelopment, economic aspi-
rations and institutionalized economic achievement, poverty and fanta-
sies of material success, powerlessness and expected comfortable
empowerment, Black, Hispanic and Asian persons and communities and
white Anglos or other persons, immigrants and citizens. 9 But these
demographics do not accurately describe the patterns of authority and
empowerment governing these issues among those peoples. Power, es-
pecially economic power, and authority remain white-dominated in ways
little touched by existing racial integration. The Los Angeles police de-
partment and its chief were notorious for harshly prejudicial treatment
of citizens and non-citizens of color.10 The control of jobs for persons
5. Jacques Attali has written a provocative future projection of the international com-
munity, raising issues which will be further considered. See JACQUES ATrALI, MILLENNIUM:
WINNERS AND LOSERS IN THE COMING WORLD ORDER (1991).
6. George Bush, Bush:'Out of These Troubled Times . . . a New World Order,'
Speech Before Joint Session Congress (Sept. 11, 1990), in WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1990, at
A34.
7. See infra notes 9-18 accompanying text.
8. Germany Looks at Itself and Winces, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28-Dec. 4, 1992, at 55.
9. DAVID REIFF, Los ANGLES: CAPITAL OF THE THIRD WORLD 31 (1991).
10. See Jane R. Fitsch & Frederick M. Muir, COUNCIL MAJORITY BACKS POLICE PANEL
REFORM PACKAGE; COMMISSION: THEY SEEK FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF CHRISTOPHER RE-
PORT, INCLUDING ITS CALL FOR A NEW CHIEF. FORMER CHIEF DAVIS ALSO URGES GATES TO
STEP ASIDE, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1991 at Al.
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of color never lay in their home neighborhoods and the situs of those
jobs increasingly fled the same neighborhoods." South Central Los
Angeles offers little systemic hope of escape from poverty or from a con-
stant struggle among its youth and their families for non-gang-related
sources of personal dignity and respect.
In such a context, crime, "disturbances," racial and other riots,
looting and other even momentary public order breakdowns cannot es-
cape evaluation along a range of comparative international questions.
These significantly include judicious considerations of histories, paral-
lels and trends in various colonial territories prior to the formal dissolu-
tion of the former European empires. For our purposes here, a
convenient benchmark for such comparisons is the year 1955: the year
of the Bandung Conference that gave the third world its first infusion of
global self-consciousness. 12 The general history of colonial territories is
one of dominating European minority groups with cultures influential
on but separate from those of majority indigenous populations. Yet this
minority controlled the legal, military, economic, administrative, trans-
port and financial resources and systems in the territories.' 3 Neverthe-
less, ideas about self determination, freedom, an equitable share of the
territory's economic resources and control of their own lives for their
own ends was long discussed by, made coherent in and increasingly
served as the focus of committed organization among active groups of
these indigenous peoples.14
From the purview of the colonial elite an accurate understanding of
any breakdown in public order along the axis of "disturbance" to
"crime" to "insurrection" to "revolution" was crucial to maintaining
their rule. Although understanding the facts of such incidents and draft-
ing the press-release-public-reactions to them were sometimes different
for colony and metropolitan capital consumption, they were most often
part of the domination of the majority by the ruling minority. 15 The
most frequent colonial-elite response was to resolutely drain such inci-
dents of all political content or pleas for economic empowerment.
These responses asserted the criminality of the acts, their lack of local
roots and their aberrational character and contrasted that to the alleg-
edly known contentment of the "natives" with the status quo political ar-
rangements, i.e., minimal local governmental positions under co-optive
and watchful metropolitan eyes.
Wrapped in an envelope of racism, this response stemmed from
various combinations of sheer ignorance of "native politics" and willful
blindness to clear signs that self-determination, nationhood and ridding
11. Id. at 64-78.
12. See, e.g., 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, ASIAN DRAMA - AN INQUIRY INTO THE POVERTY OF NA-
TIONS 124, 210 (1968).
13. For example see, BASIL DAVIDSON, THE BLACK MAN'S BURDEN-AFRICA AND THE
CURSE OF THE NATION-STATE 118-91 (1992).
14. Id. at 162-96.
15. See id. at 68-85. No colonial perception of changes towards independence in the
colonies; no planning done, e.g. for handover at an upcoming independence.
[Vol. 70:2
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
the territory of foreign occupiers in the search for a better life were
ideas of concrete and intensifying currency. 16 A further basis was the
colonial elite's fear of being removed from comfortable lifestyles. Thus
any substantial change in dignity, wealth and power relations between
colonizers and the colonized was an anathema and demands for the
same were beyond the pale of rationality. If such demands became too
strident more suppressing military force was applied and the perpetra-
tors' actions were further scrubbed of political, economic or racial
meaning. This was done in substantial part through law and legal char-
acterization by labeling, prosecuting, convicting, imprisoning, exiling
and sometimes executing the violators as "criminals." Such persons
were seen as wrongdoers who were detrimental to good society and
their actions required a restoration of the status quo social fabric, cer-
tainly not a radical remaking or a replacement of it.
Los Angeles cannot escape the issues raised by this history, even
though the outcomes will differ in important ways from colonial/libera-
tion precedents. It is beyond this article to pronounce on the final reso-
lution of such questions. But those decision makers with authority to
shape, assess and enforce legal and community policy responses to the
Los Angeles riots now face the validity of those issues.
III. BRIEF REFLECTIONS ON PAST TRENDS
Notwithstanding other important contributing factors to the Los
Angeles riots, race and the consequences of racism are critical for any
understanding of what occurred. Racism against Afro-Americans in the
United States has been an international question in varying postures
since before the American Revolution. 17 While the United States prior
to the Civil war struggled to retain the profits and benefits of the slave
trade, the growing international illegality of slavery intensified the moral
and legal questions regarding the personhood of, and equity towards,
Afro-Americans. 18 The actions of dominant American white classes and
decision-makers were measured not only by emerging global anti-slav-
ery norms, themselves inconsistent in those historical circumstances, but
equally by American ideals of liberty, equality and justice. These ideals
in turn further influenced the rise of analogous international legal
principles. 19
16. Id.
17. See generally JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY To FREE-
DoM-A HISTORY OF NEGRO AMERICANS (6th ed. 1988).
18. See generally A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MArTER OF COLOR, RACE, & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978).
19. For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims,
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." The Universal Declara-
tion grants two categories of rights; civil and political rights, 1st generation rights; and
economic, social and cultural rights, 2nd generation rights.
The first generation rights include the right to life, liberty and security of person; the
right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile; right to presumption of inno-
cence. See THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 2 1 7 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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A century later one outcome of this clash of expectations was the
confirmed international and national criminality of slavery evidenced by
the strong leadership of the United States in drafting into the United
Nations Charter clear legal prohibitions against racism.20 Despite the
hope and advocacy of Afro-America, however, the United States subse-
quently moved to downgrade these provisions to no more than "moral
principles," ensuring that they were not construed within federal law as
legal rights. 2 1 Despite executive foreign policy pronouncements and
some desegregation of American armed forces during World War II that
had created a body of non-discrimination policy for oversees consump-
tion, there was no federal civil rights law in the immediate postwar
period.
22
Nevertheless, one issue raised in both federal and state courts dur-
ing this period was whether such policy pronouncements could be given
some weight by United States' courts in considering claims by Afro-
Americans, and other persons of color, of a right to be free of racial
discrimination. 23 In other words, did United States propaganda in-
tended as either boilerplate or for overseas consumption, though not
dispositive in se on the existence of legal rights, have legal consequences
that courts were bound to take notice of as "federal public policy?" In
Oyama v. California 24 the Supreme Court said "yes" in strong dicta.2 5 A
20. The Purposes of the United Nations are:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace.
U.N CHARTER art. 1, 2.
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Na-
tions shall promote:
(a) higher standards of living, full employment, and. conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development;
(b) solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
(c) universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
U.N CHARTER art. 55.
"All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N. CHARTER
art. 56.
21. President Harry S. Truman, United Nations Conference on International Organi-
zation, Address During Final Plenary Session (June 26, 1945), in 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 3
(1945).
22. The first Civil Rights Act passed after World War II was not passed until 1957.
Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1958).
23. See generally RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY ch. 2 (1979).
24. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
25. Id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring).
There are additional reasons now why that law stands as an obstacle to the free
accomplishment of our policy in the international field. One of these reasons is
that we have recently pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations to
"promote ... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion."
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few other courts followed, but the most either denied the right 26 or
found (or invented) safe domestic constitutional grounds to grant it.
27
This points to the long-existing tension between the international legal
rights of Afro-Americans and other minorities, plus international expec-
tations opposing that particular form of racism and the generally more
limited Afro-American rights stated in American law. It is also a neces-
sary element for understanding the international reactions to the Los
Angeles riots.
Since the formation of the United Nations, the United States, as a
matter of unadmitted executive policy, has labored to prevent United
Nations consideration of any racial conflict arising within America. 28
For instance, periodically during the years of South African "grand
apartheid" black (and other) members of the United States' United Na-
tion's delegations were ordered to aver both how well American race
relations were being played out and how little concrete action was
needed by the United Nations against South Africa. 29 The hypocrisy was
notable, unforgettable and bitter for the Black persons involved. It also
illustrated simultaneously the racist elements in United States foreign
policy and the co-optive strategies of American racism.
In this connection, we must consider the rise of the United States as
a great power since the end of World War II. Considerable interna-
tional expectations were generated across the entire value spectrum by
United States power globally projected during both the Cold War rivalry
with the Soviet Union and in this still-young post-Cold War period. A
pertinent slice of such expectations of a great power is that the mainte-
nance of public order within the United States is presumed to be more
effective, efficient and stable overall than is generally the case in devel-
oping countries. Its Constitution is the world's most long-lived; its gov-
ernmental institutions are influential and much imitated; its legal system
has exported thousands of lawyers to carry the message of constitution-
alism, separation of powers and individual rights; and its economy is the
world's richest. Equally, its corporations have helped spread consumer-
ism around the world during the 20th century °3 0 Thus it is expected
that American streets will generally be safe (although the statistics of
American crime, and its cowboy traditions are globally known); its gov-
ernmental institutions and ministers will be stable under the Constitu-
Id.
26. See, e.g., Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
27. See, e.g., Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
28. From this author's knowledge, all Afro-American human rights petitions to the
U.N. Human Rights Commission have been barred from that body's agenda. In 1978
there was consternation in the White House and executive branch when it was learned that
an Afro-American member of a United Nations Human Rights Working Group had voted
that a group of petitions from the United States presented sufficient claim of a national
pattern of gross violations of the human rights of Afro-Americans through police brutality
to qualify such claim being forwarded to the United Nations Sub-Commission for the pre-
vention of Racial and Religious Discrimination. Immediate steps were taken to block such
claim.
29. See J.C. MILLER, THE BLACK PRESENCE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1978).
30. ATrALI, supra note 5, at 92-113.
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tion; its political leaders will act lawfully without trying to seize military
power; and the visible economy will actually determine the movement of
prices, goods and services.
Certainly part of such expectations is that the United States cannot
be a country where traveling foreign tourists must be warned by their
home governments to be either vigilant or to stay away entirely because
of riots in the streets. Nor would it be expected that such tourists would
need to be warned of the ineffectiveness of the police and the absence of
restraints on official racism. Yet, this is basically what happened in Los
Angeles.
IV. THE REACTION TO THE RIOTS: ISSUES AND PROJECTIONS -
FRANCE AND JAPAN
The reactions to the Los Angeles riots were emblematic of a glob-
ally-interdependent post-Cold War world community. They were also
emblematic of the virtual disappearance of the insulation historically
provided the United States by two large oceans, especially when its gov-
ernment wished to invoke it, and the additional insulation provided by
the expectations of public order stability. Further, part of the domi-
nance of the United States as a great power has included the capacity to
control to its liking, the allocation of doctrine, decision-making and
world community scrutiny under international law concerning the
"proper" definition of "domestic jurisdiction" under Article 2(7) of the
United Nations Charter.3 ' Expectations that this dominance will con-
tinue have taken a beating. The United States has made stringent at-
tempts to bar from official international scrutiny, especially deliberation
by any United Nations organ, questions concerning racial justice and the
enforcement of rights of Afro-Americans and other minorities. 32 Such
attempts have been more noteworthy given the openness of the Ameri-
can press and public opinion to global view; racism in the lives of Afro-
Americans has been globally perceived in fact for many years. The ques-
tion arises whether one consequence of the Los Angeles riots will be
successful official investigations of police brutality and other detailed ac-
tions sustaining racism through the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mission, the General Assembly and other organs notwithstanding
Washington's opposition.
The actual reactions to the riots have far reaching implications for
international law and its meaning to Afro-America and otherwise. It can
first be noted that the United States, relative to the Los Angeles riots,
31. The Organization and its members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforce-
ment measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 7.
32. See supra notes 20-30 and accompanying text.
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was treated like its State Department often treats developing countries,
i.e., public warnings to Americans abroad against traveling to specific
countries or particular parts therein because of "civil unrest," "hostile
attitudes towards foreigners or Americans" or even "bodies lying in the
streets." For example, there was an official expression of concern by the
Japanese Foreign Ministry for the safety of Japanese tourists in Los An-
geles.33 There were similar expressions of concern by the Korean
government.
3 4
The Japanese response must be measured against previously ex-
pressed official Japanese racially defamatory attitudes toward Afro-
Americans, which included alleging their detriment to the American
economy.3 5 In making this public expression of concern, the Japanese
government determined that the Los Angeles riot situation was, for
whatever reasons, not one which fell within the domestic jurisdiction of
the United States. Thus, it was not barred from international scrutiny.
Japan would have also necessarily determined (or assumed) that such
official statements did not constitute an illegal intervention by Japan into
the internal affairs of the United States. The Korean government appar-
ently made identical determinations before doing even more far-reach-
ing acts, namely, asking domestic American television to regulate
(suppress) scenes of Black/Korean violence connected with the riots,
supposedly for the safety of the Koreans involved.
3 6
A second category of responses revolved around assigning causality
for the riots. Some national leaders, such as President Mitterand of
France, ascribed to Washington the responsibility and drew a cause-and-
effect relationship between Reagan-Bush policies oppressing Afro-
Americans and Los Angeles.3 7 Other spokespersons warned that the
same potential for insurrection or civil breakdown existed in European
cities. 38 They pointed to the increasingly well known facts regarding
racism in London against Africans and South Asian immigrants, and in
several German cities against several classes of immigrants. 39 Not
counting Paris' 20th century history of being a principal haven of a per-
manent expatriate/exile Afro-American community, 40 the ascription of
causality by Mitterand is noteworthy for several reasons. Racism is cur-
rently closer to the political surface in France, particularly against North
Africans, and, anti-semitism, driven in part by the fulminations of the
French political right.4 1 Mitterand, now weathering visible challenges to
33. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 1992, at
A8.
34. Id.
35. Hobart Rowen, Thanks (?), Mr. Nakasone, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1986, at Fl.
36. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 20.
37. Id. at A8.
38. Arthur Brice, America Reacts: A Plea for Calm Aghast, the World Watches S. Korean Presi-
dent Urges Protection of Korean-Americans as U.S. Race Relations Are Examined Overseas in Light of
Riots, ATLANTA J. & CONSTITUTION, May 2, 1992, at A10.
39. Id.; see also Germany Looks at Itself, supra note 8, at 550.
40. For example, Chester Himes, James Baldwin and Memphis Slim.
41. Especially the fulminations of Jean-Marie LePen. See L'EFFET LE PEN: DOSSIER
(Edwy Plenel & Alain Rollat eds., 1984. For further discussion of the French right see
1993]
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his presidency, may have used such a statement to strengthen French
opinion against the rightists, while revealing his own commitment to eq-
uity and attacking a convenient target. But it is abnormal diplomatic
practice to draw such stark causal conclusions, particularly by direct pro-
nouncement by the Head of State (as opposed to a more junior official)
regarding a major ally. Normally, events such as the Los Angeles riots
would be merely commented on by an Ambassador expressing regret
for their occurrence, with perhaps obliquely-expressed hopes that mat-
ters will move in the just and equitable direction, of course under the
wise guidance of the national capital. For whatever reasons, President
Mitterand, a ranking intellectual and Resistance hero in his own right,
felt that racism against Afro-America was not only a fit subject for inter-
national scrutiny, but that the causes of the riots were sufficiently clear
to assign policy responsibility to the conservative Washington regime.
I emphasize this because of the freedom Mitterand apparently felt
in moving from the particulars of Los Angeles to the more general
objectives and consequences of federal policies. Perhaps he had in mind
cuts in those categories of aid to cities that most benefit poor Afro-
Americans,4 2 the establishing of public images of mean-spiritedness, en-
couragement of racial stereotypes 43 and the fostering of racially co-op-
tive strategies. 4 4 Such freedom is generally lacking in the American
news and intellectual media, in part because it is blocked by the concept
of an "issue" needing to rest on nothing more substantive than an op-
posing public contention, irrespective of the content, plausibility or
truth of the contention. To the media it is the existence of the conten-
tion that governs, not the accuracy of the depiction. Over time this can
lead to a silent assumption in American public discourse that no plausi-
ble broad generalities exist. Such an assumption can especially arise
concerning the appraisal of important national policies, particularly con-
cerning the presence and causal responsibility for the existence of ra-
cism and actions with racist consequences. In this respect, if Mitterand's
observations were taken seriously enough to be incorporated into the
national public discourse 4 5 they would have at least momentarily raised
the tone of such discourse about race in America, whether he was right
(as this author believes, in the main) or wrong.
From the 1920's through recent years many Europeans, including
the French, often had stark, direct and harsh images of how the United
MAXIM SILVERMAN, DECONSTRUCTING THE NATION: EMIGRATION, RACISM AND CITIZENSHIP
IN MODERN FRANCE (1992).
42. For example, cuts in food stamps, and arguing in support of the tax exempt status
of Bob Jones University. See A COMMON DESTINY - BLACKS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY ch. 6
(Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds. 1989).
43. For example, the use of Willie Horton during the 1988 Presidential campaign.
44. For example, the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings.
45. Not only does there appear to be no evidence that his observations were taken
seriously, but in apparent reaction to the least suspicion of administration responsibilities,
the Bush administration assigned the blame for Los Angeles to the 1960's programs of the
war on poverty presumably fostered by Democrats. See Ann Devroy, White House Blames
Liberal Programs for Unrest; 'Great Society 'Initiatives Started in 1960s are at Root of Many Problems,
Fitzwater Says, WASH. POST, May 5, 1992, at A8.
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States treated Black people. The directness of those images, from per-
sonal experience, was sometimes ajolt even to Afro-Americans traveling
or living in Europe at the time. A generalized pattern of national racism
was freely drawn, including for example, the confirmations of lynchings
and chaingangs in the South and race riots and widely-deprived political
and economic rights in the North. The jolt was not that such conclu-
sions were false-they were, upon reflection, often more true than not.
Rather the jolt came because they were pulled together and drawn on
that scale and national official responsibility assigned, rather than being mod-
erated in the soup of myriads of softening issues such as private discre-
tion versus official action.
One can argue that those conclusions rested in part on the compar-
ative absence of racism in Europe, confirmed by both expatriate Afro-
American literature and exiles voting with their feet (even though some,
after suitable recuperation, did return to the United States). 46 It might
also be observed that contributing to such conclusions were French aca-
demic tendencies to view racism in a psychological framework, with
some focus on blacks' reaction to oppression and exclusion and the
structures contained in culture that support racism. 47 The sharpness of
views about American life had its points of accuracy and points of omis-
46. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. The references to racism in this Article
are to the racism of color, the racism that is directed toward peoples of African heritage.
Clearly, the comparative (to the United States) strains-both historically and in the 20th
century-of anti-semitism in France, Nazi Germany and elsewhere in Europe. A discus-
sion of anti-semitism as racism is beyond the scope of this article. However, cf infra note
47.
47. JACQUES LACAN, THE FOUR FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS OF PsycHo-ANALYSIS (Norton
Paper 1981). Lacan rejects an explanation rooted in history to account for the rise of
Nazism and the holocaust. He instead would find a psychoanalytic explanation in (1) the
difficulty of even confronting ("turning a courageous gaze toward the phenomenon") the
subject, and (2) such difficulty being rooted in the reluctance to move beyond "the fascina-
tion of the sacrifice in itself" that Nazism and the holocaust represent and the attempt to
ascribe our own desires in this regard to the presence of an Other whom Lacan calls "the
dark God." Id. at 274-75.
Similarly, Henri Lefebvre finds an explanation for the "Hitlerian mystique" in "the
rejection of everyday life - of work, of happiness - a mass phenomenon, a malady of the
decaying middle classes, a collective neurosis (where in France it was merely an individual
phenomenon) .... " See Henri Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life 130-31, 242, 245 (Moore
trans., 1992). He finds the struggle for the meaning of Auschwitz to rest on the efforts of
its survivors "to go back in time, back to . . . the suffering which killed their feelings and
their power to remember, in order to recapture the things the 'objective' reports have
been unable to grasp." Id. at 242. Lefebvre, in arguing that the meaning of everyday life
is found in the dialectic between reason and absurdity, concludes by then extracting, from
a host of other possible meanings, including that of Hitler's sadism, a "dominant, essential
meaning" for those concentration camps: "if racism represents the most extreme form of
capitalism, the concentration camp is the most extreme and paroxysmal form of a modern
housing estate, or of an industrial town." Id. at 245.
Further, in a rich interpretation of Derrida, Geoffrey Bennington cites Derrida as
showing a synthesis between Freud and Moses in their both being lawgivers and both
needing the other to be fully understood. Bennington finds these perceptions applicable
to the work of Martin Bernal in the United States as Bernal argues against "the systematic
repression of the Afroasiatic and more especially Egyptian roots of Ancient Greece." He
finds an identity between Bernal's work and Bernal's uncertainty as to whether he may be
"an academic outsider," and links that uncertainty to the creative substance of Bernal's
work. See Mosaic Fragment: ifDerrida were an Egyptian... 'in DERRIDA: A CRITICAL READER,
97-119, 114-15 (David Wood, ed., 1992).
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sion and distortion (e.g., Capone gangsterism in Chicago). These views
were perhaps somewhat moderated over the years when the news of the
successes of the civil rights movement and the consequent federal legis-
lation was digested in French public attitudes. However, again from
personal experience, such digestion occurred in the early 1960's in the
context of racism against Algerians by large sections of conservative
French people concerning the Algerian war.
It is in this context that President Mitterand offered his conclusions
of the causal responsibility of national American policy for the racism at
the heart of the civil breakdown in Los Angeles. In so doing, he directly
connected Los Angeles to the question of whether there is a general
national American condition of widespread oppression of Afro-Ameri-
cans (and implicitly other peoples of color) by whites and the white-
dominated official establishment. It is a valuable, bracing and invigo-
rating question with an obvious answer to most Afro-Americans. Unfor-
tunately, its reception in American public discourse would feature
massive resources deployed to attack the validity of the question to es-
cape answering it on its own terms. In fact, the Bush Administration's
substantive response was to blame Los Angeles on the Democrats' social
programs of the 1960's!48 Mitterand's action represents a valuable pub-
lic policy opportunity for the United States created from the ashes of
Los Angeles; it is rapidly being lost.
But Mitterand's, and the more general historical French, conclu-
sions also represent a strongly implied conclusion of legitimacy and mo-
rality, and thus of international law. The determination that Afro-
Americans have internationally perceptible human rights permits
outside scrutiny for protection of those rights. That protection implies
at least drawing conclusions of legally-cognizable wrongdoing and as-
signing public responsibility to the United States government and other
elites as the violators.4 9 This is important because Afro-America is a
completely encapsulated group within the only remaining great power,
with the presumed competence to regulate its own internal affairs as an
incidence of its great power status. Absent perhaps Holocaust-like ge-
nocide, or organized racial slavery, traditional international law tends to
screen from international view the treatment by the United States gov-
ernment (and theoretically, any government) of its constituent peoples.
Minorities are assigned only such international standing as the national
government consents to allow them 5 ° . Mitterand's statement is thus yet
another harbinger of the continuing erosion of the traditional Westpha-
lian model of international law. It is a harbinger of evolution toward
some future model where constituent peoples have international rights
against maltreatment by their national governments, rights that foreign
actors have some obligation to help protect and enforce.
48. See supra note 45.
49. Cf AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT-A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD 268-71 (1992).
50. See generally James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: 'Peoples'or 'Governments'?, in THE
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES at 60-61 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
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V. COMPARATIVE CLAIMS AND CAUSALITY - SOUTH KOREA
The President of South Korea expressed his country's concern on
somewhat different grounds than President Mitterand. He officially con-
veyed his concern to the United States government for (1) attacks by
Afro-Americans on Korean citizens and immigrants; (2) the inability of
the Los Angeles police to protect Koreans in those circumstances; (3)
the assertion of a legal duty of the United States to protect the South
Korean Consulate from attack, and implied fault for its inability to do so;
and (4) the lack of effective state remedies for Koreans harmed or dam-
aged in these circumstances.
5 1
Those claims by the Korean government raise two questions of pos-
sible United States responsibility under international law. The first is
whether the United States might be liable for a denial ofjustice to Korea
or its citizens or kinfolk. The second is whether the United States might
be liable through some other breach under the doctrine of state respon-
sibility. Both of these delicts can only be made out by a close examina-
tion of the facts surrounding any lack of protection in the riot regarding
any or all Koreans. A charge of denial of justice would generally be
founded on either the lack or the inadequacy ofjudicial or other reme-
dies at law to compensate the victims, provided their harm was of a sort
perceptible under international law. 52 Otherwise a violation of United
States' obligations towards Korea could be based on the lack or inade-
quacy of police protection available to Koreans either in reasonable an-
ticipation of the riot or during its course. 53
The United States thus faces potential liability under international
law from at least two directions. It faces possible liability to Korea and is
also potentially liable to the majority of residents of South Central Los
Angeles, and to Rodney King, for continuing violations of a list of their
international human rights. The latter include rights to due process, to
be treated fairly during an arrest and to be free of state-administered
arbitrary physical abuse. 54 Residents of the barrios and ghettos of Los
Angeles can well argue that their rights to equal protection, to work, to
an education, to adequate food and health care, to adequate housing, to
essential social services and other rights under both international cus-
tomary and treaty law were, and are, violated on a continuing basis. 5 5
However, the application and enforcement of United States liability and
the benefits of these rights to their holders may present different issues.
51. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
52. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (4th ed. 1990); D. P.
O'CONNELL, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAw, 1025-29 (1965).
53. O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 1028.
54. These and other first generation rights have passed into customary law and can
therefore be argued as binding on the United States. They are codified in the CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISH-
MENT, supra note 3.
55. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
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The President of South Korea stopped short of a full invocation of
United States' liability under doctrines of state responsibility regarding
harm to South Korean persons or property during the riots.5 6 In so
doing he practiced what was, relative to his country's interests, probably
wise diplomacy. Additionally he at least implicitly accepted the premise
that under international law the riots (as they produced harm to South
Koreans) were beyond the immediate control of any reasonable action
by Washington (or pertinent local California government). He also im-
plicitly accepted the premise that during the riots, the police in Los An-
geles at crucial moments were overwhelmed rather than derelict in their
duties. Thus, South Korea did not invoke Mitterand's internal policy
causal responsibility between Washington and aggrieved American citi-
zens. Rather, South Korea laid the basis for the legal responsibility of
the United States as a nation vis-a-vis Korea and other states whose na-
tionals in Los Angeles were harmed during the riots. The latter is the
more traditional claim under both diplomatic practice and international
law. 57 But again, that claim is one which historically has been made
against events and public order breakdowns in non-industrialized devel-
oping countries by the United States or European governments.
In President Bush's speech of May 1, 1992, his first after the riot,
there was no reference to any international concerns, consequences or
expectations about the events in Los Angeles. 58 However, at about the
same time, a British newspaper article directly linked Los Angeles to an
American "conspiracy of silence" on race, and the use of "codewords"
about Afro-Americans, 59 concepts not touched by the great majority of
American media. The article coupled a discussion of the notion of a
"conspiracy of silence" with an open judgment that the remedies sug-
gested by President Bush for Los Angeles were "characteristically use-
less." 60 Similar vocabulary is not often used by the American press
about any president. The article closed with a discussion of the in-
grained nature of racism in American politics. The latter is to be con-
trasted with President Bush's limited acknowledgment in the same
speech that some racial discrimination just might exist in the United
States. 6 1 The British article, like President Mitterand, was inclined to
assess the entire American process and to draw conclusions of general
applicability, specifically on matters of race. The article went further,
however, to analyze part of America's causal responsibility for Los An-
geles as being fostered by a national silence in public discourse (read,
among white elites) about any meaningful discussion about racism.
56. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
57. O'CONNELL, supra note 52, at 1024-41.
58. Text of Bush Speech on the Los Angeles Riots, Reuters, May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, WIRES file.
59. USA: Andrew Stephens America - Bush Plays The Prince of Wails - Reaction to Los Angeles






The Vatican also responded to the Los Angeles riots. Pope John
Paul II issued a statement wherein he called for civil harmony, and for
sympathy and prayers for those hurt during the disturbances. 6 2 How-
ever, within the past several years, the Pope through papal letters and
encyclicals has apparently sought to bring pervasive global economic,
social and political problems and allocations of resources under the
scrutiny of moral criteria. This has included the defining of injustice and
assigning blame to particular states.
63
In light of this demonstrated asserted competence to analyze and
exercise moral authority, the Pope's response to Los Angeles is in-
tensely interesting when compared with that of President Mitterand. By
calling only for civil harmony, the Pope gave authority to United States
political officials to resolve the situation under current American law
and policy. He provided neither moral criteria for doing so nor for any
normative assessment of United States law and policy. Unlike that of
Mitterand, the statement comprised a de facto refusal to look into the
details of the riots or their policy context. It also refused to identify and
raise questions about domination and exploitation of peoples of color as
a contributing factor, or to assess any questions of injustice raised by
such details and patterns. One must ask whether such reticence
stemmed from simply the low priority assigned by the Vatican to Los
Angeles, a fearful respect for the possible retaliatory power of the
United States or a subtle conclusion that more central discipline by na-
tional governments is needed to confront social problems irrespective of
issues of domination and exploitation. The conclusion that, in response
to Los Angeles, President Mitterand exercised greater moral interna-
tional leadership than did the Pope is difficult to escape.
VII. REACTION FROM THE SOUTHERN TIER
6 4
A. Iraq
In light of Iraq's defeat by a United States-led coalition operating
under United Nations authority in 1991, and its subsequent testing of
the limits under both international law and practical competence of Se-
curity Council enforcement options under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, Baghdad's response to Los Angeles deserves some ex-
ploration. Iraq's strategy was to characterize Los Angeles as a massive
violation of international human rights by the United States which
threatened international peace and security. In this regard it sought an
emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. Acting
62. Pope, Saddened by L.A. Riots, Urges Halt, Reuters, May 1, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, WIRES file.
63. See, e.g., CENTESIMUS ANNUS, Chapter 4, May 2, 1991, reprinted in 21 ORIGINS, May
16, 1991, at 1.
64. The Southern Tier refers to the fact that the majority of developing countries lie
in the Southern Hemispheres of the global community. See, e.g., BARBARA WARD, THE RICH
NATIONS AND THE POOR NATIONS 40 (1962); see also ATTALI, supra note 5, at 12-17.
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through an informal but known consensus among the five Permanent
Members plus others, the Council refused to call such a meeting. 6 5 The
consensus was so sweeping that the President of the Council did not feel
obliged, in response to inquiries, to state reasons for the Council's re-
fusal to meet.66 Thus whether the decision rested on a belief that under
these circumstances Los Angeles lay too deeply within the domestic ju-
risdiction of the United States to be within the competence of the Coun-
cil, that Los Angeles produced insufficiently concrete international
consequences to attract the Council's jurisdiction or was insufficient in
some other way that cannot be ascertained. In any case, the width and
strength of the informal Council consensus obviated any Council vote to
even decide against such an emergency meeting.
6 7
The Bush administration cannot have been displeased about one
immediate defacto consequence of this effective bar to Security Council
consideration: it upheld the previously-noted United States unstated
policy objective of shielding racial discrimination involving Black Ameri-
cans and Black America by official or private agencies from official
United Nations scrutiny and action.68 Mobilizing the power to bar such
questions from the agenda of key international organizations is one of
the signatures of a "superpower."
But in light of other parallels with "third world" countries to the
emerging global posture of the United States, one wonders how long
this superpower perquisite can remain effective. Furthermore, condi-
tions of massive human despair and deprivation with clear and substan-
tial human rights violations exist not only in Los Angeles but in many
cities around the world. It would indeed be desirable policy for the na-
tional governments of those cities to be the continuing subject of official
international scrutiny in the United Nations, the International Monetary
Fund and other organizations that promise effective leverage and law-
making authority to remedy such human deprivation.
It must be noted that it was easier for the United States to protect
its exclusionary interests in the Security Council simply because Iraq was
the adversary. Iraq was a current wrongdoer under international law,
particularly under Security Council resolutions enacted under Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter.69 Further, regarding the aftermath
65. Anthony Goodman, U.N. Spurns Iraqi Bid for Meeting on L.A. Riots, Reuters, May 5,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES file.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See supra text accompanying footnotes 20 to 30.
69. U.N. S.C. Res. 664, 35th Sess., 2937th mtg., (Aug. 18, 1990) (requires Iraq to
permit third country nationals to depart from Iraq and Kuwait and to rescind orders re-
quiring closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait); U.N. S.C. Res. 665, 35th
Sess., 2938th mtg., (Aug. 25, 1990) (endorses naval blockade of Iraq and Kuwait); U.N.
S.C. Res. 666, 35th Sess., 2939th mtg., (Sep. 13, 1990) (asks Secretary General to obtain
information regarding humanitarian needs created by sanctions); U.N. S.C. Res. 667, 35th
Sess., 2940th mtg., (Sep. 16, 1990) (condemns aggressive acts by Iraq against diplomatic
premises and personnel in Kuwait; demands release of foreign nationals); U.N. S.C. Res.
674, 35th Sess., 2951st mtg., (Oct. 29, 1990) (deals with hostage protection); U.N. S.C.
Res. 677, 35th Sess., 2962d mtg., (Nov. 28, 1990) (condemns Iraq for attempting to
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of its military defeat, Iraq was waging an open campaign counterattack-
ing the United States, the United Nations and the imposition of United
Nations' sanctions through the Security Council. 70 In its request for a
Security Council meeting, Iraq arguably did not sufficiently connect Los
Angeles, as a United States violation of international human rights, to a
particular threat such violation posed to international peace and secur-
ity. The United Nations Charter only provides for Security Council ac-
tion when such threat exists. 7 1 Moreover, Iraq obviously did not come
to the table with clean hands in light of its documented and often egre-
gious human rights violations against the Kurds in the northern part of
its territory and the Sh'ites in the south. 7 2 Another factor was the in-
creased influence enjoyed by the United States in the Security Council
since the demise of the Soviet Union and the success of Desert Storm
built around United States military resources and leadership.
On the other hand, deprivations of Afro-Americans, as grounds for
legal claims against the United States by Iraq and others previously
would not have been remotely credible. Now, however, such claims are
based on a wellspring of international expectations that Afro-Americans
do have internationally-protectable rights that are appropriate subjects
of international scrutiny. 73 As such these rights should be protected as
against the United States government and even against private discrimi-
natory action. 74 These expectations are widespread notwithstanding
Iraq's invocation for propaganda use. In this connection, it is interest-
ing that Iraq inverted the conventional wisdom that over time the for-
eign policy of a state generally mirrors that state's domestic policy.
Baghdad asserted that America's aggressive foreign policy caused the Los
Angeles riots. 75 That assertion was clearly made for propaganda pur-
poses. But its availability, even for those purposes, is yet another indica-
tion of the rapidly intensifying global interdependence of the
international community and the dissolution of traditional distinctions
change demographic composition of Kuwait and to destroy civil sector); U.N. S.C. Res.
678, 35th Sess., 2963rd mtg., (Nov. 29, 1990) (sets out allied coalition terms for lifting
economic sanctions).
70. For example, the Iraqi government purposely slowed down nuclear inspections
which U.N. officials were attempting to conduct in Iraq following the end of the war.
71. See Article 39 of the U.N. Charter, which states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
72. AFTER THE WAR; Unrest in Iraq Reported to Have Spread From Basra to Three Other
Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1991, at Al.
73. See YussuF KLY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE BLACK MINORITY IN THE U.S. (1985);
Henry Richardson, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under International Law, 87
AM. J. Irr'L L. -, at n.3 (forthcoming 1993); see also, the International Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 19, 1966, art. 2, 4, 5, 660 U.N.T.S.
195, reprinted in, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
74. International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, Jan. 19, 1966, art. 2,4,5, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966).
75. Iraq asks Security Council to Meet on Los Angeles Riots, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,
May 5, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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between domestic and foreign policymaking in any state. Further, this
idea is not a new one regarding the relationship of peoples of color to
the United States. It recalls the claim by Afro-Americans in World War I
that United States imperialism in the Spanish-American War, the Philip-
pines and other American outreaches in Haiti and Europe helped pro-
duce the "scientization" of American racism by importing, codifying and




Libya, another consistent and public third world opponent of the
United States, also issued a public statement on Los Angeles, though
somewhat different in content than those from Iraq. Libya analogized
the actions of Afro-Americans in the riots to the Palestinian liberation
struggle against Israel and characterized them as the "black intifada. ' ' 77
This translates into the claim under international law that Afro-America
comprises a "people," as do the Palestinians. That status serves as the
basis for international legal rights of self determination and protection
from official national reprisal for actions connected to their struggle for
liberation.78 Note that Libya also made this claim with less than clean
hands regarding its mixed record of aiding liberation movements and
supporting groups whose aims and activities can only be called terrorist.
Also recall that in the recent past it has been the subject of military re-
prisals by the United States. Thus Khaddafi's objectives here were un-
doubtedly propagandistic.
This understood, we note that Libya's characterization of Afro-
America as a people under international law with a right of self determi-
nation strikes a resonant chord in Afro-American history. Some of its
leaders and their followers have made identical claims through the pres-
ent day. 79 Simultaneously, such a characterization would be taken by
numbers of Afro-Americans as expressing a greater degree of alienation
from dominant American society than is comfortable, and they would
not push Afro-American identity so far in that direction.8 0 This division
76. Francis M. Beal & Ty dePass, African-American Opposition to War - Past and Present,
CROSSROADS, Feb. 19, 1991, at 5-6.
77. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
78. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. 2, at 188, U.N. Doc. A/4494
(1960) (contains the Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples which encompasses the principle of self-determination through the free and genu-
ine expression of the will of the people as a territory).
79. See generally, MALCOLM X SPEAKS (George Breitman, ed., 1965); E. U. ESSIEN-
UDOM, BLACK NATIONALISM, A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY IN AMERICA (1962); PAUL ROBESON,
HERE I STAND (1958). The current resurgence of admiration for Malcolm X in the Black
community can be safely taken as some evidence of admiration for his ideas in this regard.
See also MALCOLM X: SPEECHES AT HARVARD 161-82, (Archie Epps ed., 1968); MALCOLM X:
THE LAST SPEECHES 111-81, (Bruce Perry ed., 1989).
80. Afro-American peoplehood implies that black Americans may in their authentic
decisions about their own political destiny, where necessary, depart from or at least se-
verely question basic principles of United States' foreign policy and domestic policy.
Where U.S. policy principles diverge from Afro-America's sense of its own welfare, there
have long been competing views in the black community around such questions. An im-
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of interpretation in the Afro-American international tradition is an inte-
gral part of Black History.8 1
Neither the Libyan nor the Iraqi reactions to Los Angeles, nor that
from European commentators, can be solely understood through the no-
tion that America must be held under international expectations to the
obligation of living up to its own principles and ideals. Under another
body of expectations, the justice involved, constitutionally and other-
wise, in the economic, political and cultural representation of the peo-
ples of each country vis-a-vis its central government must be assessed by
the international community for the continuation of that government's
authority. There has also appeared in international law a right to repre-
sentative government,8 2 which right, like any other, may be invoked by
any international actor in a position to do so for a range of purposes,
desirable or otherwise. Clearly this new right claims part of its legal
provenance from American ideals and constitutionalism as they have
spread globally. This right is now being invoked by peoples beyond
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.8 3 It places a burden on those
who would deny its application to encapsulated peoples within estab-
lished states, such as Afro-Americans and other peoples of color within
the United States. They must explain why it remains supremely impor-
tant that such expectations continue to be barred by territorial borders
as a matter of law, notwithstanding an intensifying global interdepen-
dence that percolates through all national states across the full value
spectrum of human aims and resources. In response to Los Angeles,
one Spanish commentator crystallized at least part of this burden by
stating that Los Angeles is a frank recognition of a global trend where
"white minorities are getting richer and masses of dark and yellow skin
peoples every day are worse off, poorer and pushed toward despair."'8 4
C. Africa
It was left to African commentators to explicitly hold America up to
the obligation to obey its own ideals ofjustice, and to strongly character-
ize Los Angeles as having violated that obligation. This was the view in
Cameroon. 85 It was also the view in Benin,8 6 but in a wider context of
portant competing viewpoint is that Afro-American liberation will occur through their sup-
porting U.S. foreign and military policy and even the broad outline of domestic policy in
order to perfect claims for the maximum enforcement of their civil rights under the United
States Constitution.
Personal decisions by individual Afro-Americans in the American political process
bear on their comfort-level regarding both challenges and loyalties to either of these inter-
pretations. See Richardson, supra note 73.
81. Id.
82. Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992).
83. Military Resists Political Change in Togo, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 26, 1992, at
4; Pope Urges Leader to Uphold Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1985, § 1, at 13.
84. World Reacts with Shock and Criticism to Los Angeles Riots, supra note 33, at A8.
85. Tsheko Lopala, Injustice Amiricaine, JEUNE AFRIQUE, May 28-June 3, 1992, at 61.
86. Nassirou Malam Issa, Los Angeles: Et si la Victime Avait Ete un Blanc... ?, JEUNE
AFRIQUE, May 28 -June 3, 1992, at 61.
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criticizing the United States for doing so by adopting inconsistent stan-
dards for judging and punishing Libya and Iraq while refusing to act
against Israel for violating Resolution 242.87 The Benin reaction fur-
ther found these inconsistencies all of a piece with the racism in the Los
Angeles acquittals. 88 This reaction represents the assertion of a further
obligation on the United States, and perhaps on other, or perhaps only
on other major states as well: that domestic and foreign policy must be
conducted with consistency under principles of justice.
Such an obligation would be particularly applied to the United
States for holding itself out (especially during the last two Presidential
administrations) to be the global repository of standards of democracy
and justice. Throughout most of the 20th century, this American claim
has been one strategy through which it projected influence and postures
of moral grace around the world, particularly regarding the character of
national governments in countries where identified United States inter-
ests came to the fore. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the
convenient foil for this strategy. Now that foil has disappeared, and it
remains to be seen whether the United States as the sole purported
great power may successfully project the same claims as keeper of the
standards of justice, when the international community is now free to
more closely examine their content free from comparative Cold War
baggage. The new international legal right to representative govern-
ment may well be defined by the democracy of the international commu-
nity and not the democracy of the United States.
But just as the black slaves, cooks, maids and handymen have always
had special insights about the politics of the "big house" of the planta-
tion owner, one may expect African peoples and peoples of African de-
scent to have special insights into and relationships to American claims
about projecting global standards of justice, particularly as those stan-
dards are applied to themselves. Thus a Nigerian commentator noted
starkly that Los Angeles demonstrates that decades of civil rights activity
by the black community in the United States have yielded little fruit.8 9
A second Nigerian commentator put Los Angeles within a spectrum
of legal events in the United States from the Noriega trial through the
Mike Tyson trial and the Clarence Thomas hearings. He concluded that
"American justice is being replaced by legal gymnastics." 9 0 He also
noted that the United States used to be the model and refuge of those
escaping injustice, but the treatment of Rodney King was just another
example in a global phenomenon of denying the humanity of black
men.9 1 The appearance of European racism, he continued, represents
not a new phenomenon but merely a lowering of barriers to enable the
87. S.C. Res. 242, U.N. SCOR, 1382d mtg., at 42, U.N. Doc. S/8289 (1967) (sets out
principles for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-israeli conflict).
88. Issa, supra note 86, at 61.
89. Obie Chukwumba, March of Fury, AFRICAN CONCORD, May 11, 1992, at 42.




world to see the underlying truth.9 2 The comment then ended with an
approximation-though wider in reference-of the Iraq claim before the
United Nations Security Council: "the injustice being dispensed
through racial prejudice is dangerous for world peace."'9 3 One thread
of linkage and commonality may be noted: W.E.B. DuBois' prediction
that the global problem of the 20th century will be the color line, pro-
vides at least part-a necessary part-of understanding the intellectual
and policy structure of international reactions to Los Angeles.
9 4
VIII. PROJECTION OF TRENDS INTO THE FUTURE
We have seen that international reactions to Los Angeles ranged
from ascribing direct policy causality to Washington for the riots to
more ambiguous calls for undefined civil harmony on some unspecified
foundation of American power, wealth and other value and legal ar-
rangements. They include attempted enforcement of the American obli-
gation to follow its own principles of justice and a designation of Los
Angeles as part of a global phenomenon of racism threatening world
peace. It should also be recalled that Los Angeles and its progeny are
happening during a decade of resurgent conservative political aggres-
sion, inter alia, pushing business and financial ideology, supporting lan-
guage usage, legal protection, social privileges and respectability and
the devolution of social responsibility from government to corporate
decisionmakers under the guise of "individual responsibility. ' 9 5 This
has occurred not only in the United States but throughout much of the
international community under heavy Euro-influence, including the
decisionmaking of key international financial institutions such as the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.9 6 The impact can be
registered, for example, in a clear decade-long trend of many develop-
ing countries, under international inducement or economic coercion, re-
vising their investment codes to make them more hospitable to
incoming multinational corporations as a primary development strat-
egy.9 7 When this is added to similar trends in Britain, Japan and Ger-
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many and to the rise of notions of free enterprise economies as the sole
route and condition for protecting basic human rights, the responsibility
of corporate-oriented public policy and its decisionmakers for Los An-
geles becomes more apparent. Shrill assertions of individual criminal or
other personal responsibility as sole explanations for destruction of
property, rebellion against existing authority and loss of life acquire
more than a taint of fraud.
Thus the question arises of how to understand the Los Angeles ri-
ots in the context of the mighty struggle by international capitalism.
This struggle is not only to externalize the profits and expansive ar-
rangements of international capital through international legal and na-
tional policy systems, but also to internalize within the human mind its
privileges through a push to, inter alia, modify the moral imperatives per-
tinent to peoples of color. Such peoples are thus to be made the un-
grateful aggressors against a beneficent national and international
system, which in its beneficence can assume no responsibility for their
systemic or individual oppression. The "kind and gentle" system seeks
to enforce false premises by not only attempting to subvert notions of
justice, but through equal subversion of usages of language and regula-
tion of standards of legitimate reasoning and knowledge.
The question for Afro-Americans and other peoples of color encap-
sulated in the United States may be the nature of the signal Los Angeles
sends about, in the formulation ofJacques Attali, 9 8 America's role in the
emerging Japanese-America-European Economic Community triad:
whether these globally influential core societies will emerge as equal
partners or even viable economies without resolving fundamental ques-
tions of racism and sexism towards their encapsulated peoples, injustice
towards outsiders and other systemic oppression in each of their com-
munities. This question cannot be separated from the relationship in
the international community of these core states to their peripheries:
Latin America for the United States, Africa for Europe and South Asia
for Japan. The question is whether Attali's depressing Hobbesian vision
of this relationship as nasty, brutish in its exploitation (except for fa-
vored and nomadic elites in periphery countries), and without much
hope that the peoples of the periphery can equitably share, or be al-
lowed to share in global development and resources equal to those of
the core states, will accurately explain the transition to the 21 st century.
But the periphery is not merely something "foreign, out there."
Global interdependence brings periphery demands, resources, impera-
tives and moral and legal expectations into the triad, not least the
United States. Los Angeles, notwithstanding its territorial location, is
the periphery. Its demand for a massive reallocation of economic op-
portunities, infrastructure, respect for peoples of color, new approaches
May 14, 1992, at 18; see also Paul Peters, Investment Risk and Trust: The Role of International
Law, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 131-54 (Paul De Waart et al. eds.,
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to knowledge and reasoning and supporting rights and legal principles,
comprise a demand from the periphery only slightly removed.9 9 If the
American response to Los Angeles decisively moves towards such real-
locations and perceives that America has become a truly plural society,
whether its elites so wish it or not, then a beacon might be lit in Attali's
sea of gloom for justice in triad policies towards the peripheries.
The more immediate issue concerns the international legal system's
current struggle to accommodate the push of international capital,' 0 0
and still address with justice the political, economic, developmental, eq-
uitable and environmental needs of all peoples in the international com-
munity. Can law play a role in relieving Attali's pessimism about the
slim chances for the equitable development of peoples in the periphery
states? The issue, regarding law and the constitutive structure of the
international community in the emergence of any new world order, may
revolve in part around the current wave of proposed revisions of the
United Nations Charter and reforms of the United Nations system.
These proposals tend towards more stable funding and provision of mil-
itary forces available for peacekeeping, enlargement of the Security
Council to add more Permanent Members, reform of the Secretariat for
economy and efficiency, a United Nations Development Security Council
to address with higher priority international development needs and re-
examination of the authority of the Secretary-General.101
Will such reforms, to the extent they are authoritatively enacted
into law, create or help create rights and obligations to serve in relieving
the plight of inner city residents in Los Angeles, London, Rio de
Janeiro, Lagos or Mexico City, to name but a few? Will new foundations
be laid for enforcing the full range of these peoples' international
human rights as against their national governments, for attracting jobs
and investment into those communities, for providing better safeguards
against racist and other discriminatory law enforcement and national
governmental resource allocation? Or will Charter reforms be blocked
from such "domestic" application by the fearful Westphalian response
of governments still reluctant to attain the competence to fairly repre-
sent all the peoples within their territorial boundaries? So far, there is
little reason to believe that international corporate culture is equipped
to realize how profoundly it must change to avoid a perpetual series of
wars and attacks, of which Los Angeles was only one.
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